Personal Identity and Conflict

September 24th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

You are unique in that you are a description for a unique amalgamation of relationships. You change according to how those relationships change and according to how you (or others, I suppose) attend to them.

You are a fun-house mirror reflecting other fun-house mirrors reflecting other fun-house mirrors. What ultimate thing is being reflected? Nothing. Everything. It doesn’t matter; you are a reflection of nothing and everything, and everything and nothing are a reflection of you. Welcome to the fun-house. The exits are lies.*

As one purpose of this blog is to help resolve intra-personal conflict–a topic I haven’t even touched upon yet–now is a good time to examine these defining relationships in greater detail. I hope to show not only how they contribute to our personal strife, but how personal strife is what defines us, period.

The first and most obvious defining relationship–and conflict–is between you and your parents. Your so-called blank slate is molded half from your father and half from your mother, genetically at birth and memetically during your early development. The genes and memes from both may play well enough together to prevent you from spontaneously dying or going insane, but nonetheless they do carry with them various conflicting dispositions and predispositions. And that’s not even taking into account that both your father and mother have intra-personal strife, as well.

It’s pretty much downhill from there, but not necessarily in a bad way. Every person you meet, every thing you encounter–including your past self and your projected future self–vies for territory in your identity, for attention and significance in the relationships that define you. Depending on you, you might become more or less consolidated or confused, thus affecting your ability to answer the ultimate question, “What now?”

But what would you be without this strife? Different must persist for any thing to be. No thing has the memory required to keep all its relationships in consideration at the same time to ensure absolute consistency. The closer you can get, though, the more consistent you can be in your encounters with other people, and the stronger your relationships with them will be, the effects of which lasting beyond your own lifetime. A form of immortality, partially fulling your primal need to persist in spite of the univeral law that you ultimately can not.

As you inevitably age and lose some of your capacity to adjust, both physically and mentally, your identity becomes more static. That is not to say, however, that it becomes less conflicted. Just that it’s harder to change, period. This should be incentive to resolve your innermost conflicts sooner rather than later, since resolution requires change.

I’ll talk more about conflict and its resolution at a later time. (Hint: resolution begins with acceptance.)

* I bet you never expected me to quote your decade-old tagline, did you Ray?

Attention

July 15th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

I previously mentioned significance and influence and their roles in personal identity (and that of things in general). A common problem, however, is that we are confused about what the relationships actually are that define a thing, or what their relative significance actually is. We see the thing as a whole, but have difficulty seeing what it is that makes it what it is.

Unfortunately, I don’t see a solution to this problem beyond mindfulness and variety of experience. If anything, I am about to bring to the surface another confounding factor: attention.

On the one hand, that which is significant demands attention, which makes sense. If a significant relationship that defines me is threatened, I should attend to it–assuming I’m interested in self-preservation, that is. However, it also works the other way around; that which is attended to demands significance.

I’ll say it again a different way: attention increases significance. Well, is this good or bad? As usual, it depends, but given “bad” events (those that threaten me) tend to demand more significance than “good” events, I can honestly say I therefore only tend to attend to those cases in which artificially raising a relationship’s significance is ultimately harmful. Nonetheless, we can imagine both scenarios with a single example from my professional life.

I am having a productive day, being mindful of the significance of each of my tasks and performing them in the corresponding priority with regards to the goals of the company, when the operations officer barges into my office to make a special request on behalf of a client. To the client, this request really is the number one priority of the moment, but to my company, it’s nothing, and actually compromises our goals (evidence that it must be done to keep the client is not forthcoming, even assuming we want to). Regardless, here is the person in charge of operations–the person whose job it is to be mindful of all the internal relationships of the company to ensure everyone is working toward a common goal–sabotaging his own process at behest of a client.

So what just happened? The client got him on the phone and got his attention, and that relationship got a temporary boost in significance. So significant that even reminding him of the network of relationships that constitute the identity of the company, this relationship–this task in particular–glows brighter than the rest, as if the company will fail without it.

Good or bad? Well, bad for us, good for the client. It’s easy to see how you can use this simple observation. If you have goals you wish to pursue, but haven’t because they don’t seem important enough compared to everything else going on in your life, attend to them anyway! See how you feel if you trivialize what you’ve come to think of as significant, and emphasize something else. “My experience is what I agree to attend to,” is how William James put it. (Correction mine.)

For better or worse, there is no objective method to measure the significance of the relationships that make you you. Any method of doing so must attend to those relationships and thus alter their significance during the process. The best we can do is use our malleable memory of me-ness to subjectively ask, “Did I like me more or worse before?” But be careful, the you you attend to will seem more you!

Boundary Conditions

June 18th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Boundary conditions should be a constant consideration, generally speaking. Maybe it’s my profession, or my brush with game theory, or the contents of this blog, but I tend to ponder the consequences of boundaries–the extremes–moreso than what I more commonly encounter.

I honestly didn’t realize this about myself until I read Kevin Kelly’s post on ubiquity–thanks Keith! (Sadly I have not read much on KK’s blog, but what I have read has been great, the type of material that informs (or springs from, depending on where one starts) my general notions.)

I don’t have anything specific (or general, I guess) to say about boundary conditions at the moment, except as a reminder to myself to address them more in my posts moving forward. The fun part in discussing something, for me, is to ponder the consequences of Everything–and Nothing.

The Strong Free Will Theorem

June 4th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

I can not escape this topic. Days after my last post, a recent paper entitled The Strong Free Will Theorm fell into my lap. It mathematically proves that free will exists, based on relativity and quantum mechanics. Here I will explain how this paper fits in with my own ideas. (As well it should, since it is a specific statement within my general notions. If something contradicts my notions, I must revise my notions.)

Before any comparison can be made, we must first understand what they mean by “free will”. They define it thus:

To say that A’s choice…is free means more precisely that it is not determined by (i.e., is not a function of) what has happened at earlier times.

They prove this by showing that the information available to A is not enough to determine A’s response. (I am not going to review or critique the paper here, so read it yourself to find answers to your questions and objections.) A, by the way, is a particle “choosing” to move.

Unlike the memory, processing, and information constraints I placed upon the actor in my last free will post, the particle in their proof has perfect information and enough time to make a decision. And yet its decision is still not deterministic. So basically, it looks like everything I’ve said on free will does not apply.

Except it does. One problem with deterministic systems is deadlock; presented with two or more equivalent options, how is a choice made? Injecting some non-deterministic element–”free will”–gets the job done.

I would even say that in the example of indecision I gave, such non-deterministic involvement is even more necessary. After all, deadlocks are just one form of indecision, and indecision creeps up in many ways as you increase the constraints and complexity of the system. It helps to have undetermined nudges to cut down on processing time so that life can go on; it’s worth the risk of acting prematurely rather than die of starvation before reaching a decision.

The particle’s action is not entirely free. It is just not completely determined. Likewise, I have not advocated that the will of any thing is entirely free or entirely determined, but rather lies on a spectrum of freedom.

I admit that up until now, I was not allowing for a non-deterministic element, as I did not find it necessary. However, it is easy to plug one in. A particle is a thing with a tiny measure of free will, and we are collections of particles with, well, more free will, in the absolute sense.

True, we may be the same “percent free” as a single particle, relatively-speaking, if you broke it down that way. Or maybe we wouldn’t be. It doesn’t matter, because more importantly, we are also more complex. Our actions are both more determined and more free on an absolute scale. One does not cancel out the other. Both are required to provide a thing with the will and the means to continue to persist.

All wills are free. Just some are stronger than others. And that is what I’ve really been trying to say this whole time, that the spectrum of “free will”–as I talk about it–is not a measure of how much of our behavior is caused or uncaused, but rather a measure of our relative capacity to (correctly) evaluate options, choose one, and act on it, no matter the duration we are allotted to do so.

Free Will, Part 4: Indecision

May 27th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Being able to continuously adjust a decision given new information provides a thing with a measure of free will. We normally call this the ability to “change one’s mind”. In this actual final post on free will, I will argue that our inability to make informed decisions in the time allotted for making them–but having to act anyway–is what gives us the experience of free will.

The easiest way for me to demonstrate this is with an example, and the example I’ve chosen is the Theseus and the Minotaur maze by Robert Abbott, over at logicmazes.com. Coincidentally, the first incarnation of the online version of this maze depicts both Theseus and the Minotaur as spheres. (Not intentional, I swear!) Anyway, in this maze, the Minotaur moves twice every time Theseus moves once, but will also move horizontally before moving vertically.

Before I get further into the maze game–and before I lose you, reader, to the game–I should explain the analogy. If our sphere creature from the previous free will posts was fleeing from a predator, you’d have a situation similar to this game. After each move, the environment of the sphere changes, providing new information used to adjust its escape strategy. However, simply adjusting isn’t going to be enough; it has to be able to look several moves ahead to avoid getting caught.

In other words, the creature needs to simulate possible outcomes of its actions. Simulations require memory, and more (working) memory means more processing power. That is, as this creature grows, it can make the same decisions more quickly. The same holds for you, as you play the Theseus maze.

In the logic maze, there’s no rush to act. You can leisurely sit at your desk and work out all possibilities in your head before pressing your cursor key. In doing this, you could potentially learn, computationally, everything there is to learn about a particular maze. You can then select the winning simulation and act it out.

Now imagine that you only had five seconds to act each turn, starting from the moment the screen loads, and if you didn’t act, the Minotaur would get to move again. And just to make it more fun, when the Minotaur moves under these conditions, it will move around obstacles to reach you (in other words, cheat). Thus, you can no longer carry out every possible simulation–or more realistically, implement your entire decision-making strategy–before making a decision. You are forced to act before you’re ready. Would you agree that your inability to evaluate all the relevant information–but choosing to act anyway–makes you feel more free-willed? (Well, the time limit itself is relevant information, but whatever.)

Most every moment of our day is like this. We take in a lot of information every moment, and even after all our sensory and cognitive filters do their work, we still don’t have enough time to be certain–really certain–that our choices are the “right” choices. There are too many variables. Often we oversimplify our decision-making algorithms to fool ourselves into certainty (like finding the general notions that account for human experience, ahem), or give special attention to certain criteria, but that is merely a necessity to getting on with life.

Anyway, do I think we have free will? I think it’s clear by now that I think it’s kind of free. Could it be more free? Yes, I think it could. If we had better memories, faster neural networks, and access to more information, we’d have freer will. It’s not a question of whether free will exists, but how much we have.

Naturally, the next question is: what about absolutely free will? Well, think about that and I’ll get back to that question someday.

Free Will, Part 3: Adjustment

May 18th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Growth influences a thing’s ability to anticipate and adjust to changes in itself and its environment. This capacity for continuous adjustment is what I think should be used as the basis for a metric of gradations of will. In this post I will go into the details of this adjustment and thus finally finish my assessment of free will.

Back to our spherical creature, which can now detect light and texture to navigate terrain and find food. It can also store food, since it requires energy/materials to perform all its functions, from repair to mobilization to creating and purging and consolidating memories. Storing food requires food, too.

I’m going to run through some scenarios, making up aribtrary units of measurement.

If the creature is just sitting there, observing its environment but otherwise taking no action, it needs to spend 1 unit of food from its stores just to stay alive. Otherwise it will, oh I dunno, lose structural integrity and die. (Our first generation sphere had smaller energy demands, since it was not as large nor complex.) So it needs to find food fast and often.

Assume it has 10 Food and can detect food from a distance of 1 Movement. Its process/algorithm for persistence, then, is simple:

Is there food in direction A? No? Okay, is there food in direction B? No? Okay, is there food in direction C? Yes? Okay, move there and eat it. Is there food in (new) direction A? …

Assume it took 1 Time to detect the food and make that decision, 1 Time to eat the food, and 2 Food to take 1 Movement. It therefore spent 4 Food to get 1 Food. Not very good. It might therefore make sense to look in all directions before moving.

Is there food in direction A? No? Okay, is there food in direction B? No? Okay, is there food in direction C? Yes? Okay, how much? Oh, and is there food in direction D? Yes? Okay, how much? Is D greater than C? Yes? Okay, move there and eat it. Is there food in direction A? …

This algorithm is a little more mindful of how it spends its resources. Even if it took twice as long to perform that evaluation, it might pay off in the long run. Then again, it might not, so other conditions can get inserted:

Will there be a net increase of food in storage if the food from D is added? Yes? Okay, move there and eat it. Is there food in direction A? …

Note that I left out another crucial step:

Okay, at D now. Is the food still here? No? Okay, is there food in direction A? …

Obviously, that check must be done before it can eat the food.

All of these conditions are examples of tiny adjustments that must be made for the creature to persist. These adjustments are built up from the creature’s limited memories, so that the adjustments themselves are periodically adjusted.

While there are more modifications that could yet be made to this persistence/food-seeking strategy under the current conditions, it will be easier to communicate my point about adjustment if I allow this creature to see further. Say, 10 Movement away.

With increased perception, it has better information about its surroundings and can make better decisions about how to spend its energy; it can take stock of all the food in the area and calculate a path to maximize food consumption. It does so, and determines the best net increase of food would be from following the path A->B->F->D. (And yes, I’m ignoring the Traveling Salesman problem.)

However, upon moving to B, it can now see further in B’s direction, and sees a hoard of food at a newly disclosed location, X. But X is in the opposite direction of F and D, so forget that last plan; upon receiving new information, this process has replaced a previous decision with a new one, namely to go straight to X!

Does a creature that detects and/or reacts to new information more frequently have more will than otherwise? Does the creature that only evaluates its surroundings after traveling from A->B->F->D have less will than the one that evaluates them after every other operation? I’d say so. A lot of potentially crucial events could happen during that journey that might require a change in the original plan.

But that’s not the clever bit. I remember now that next time will be the clever bit. I thought I would get to it this time, but in light of new information, I’m forced to adjust my conclusion, though I refuse to adjust my introduction.

Domains under Heaven

May 10th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Domains under Heaven, after a long period of division, tend to unite; after a long period of union, tend to divide.

I just started reading Romance of the Three Kingdoms and was delighted at the opening line. The notion that difference persists is not a new one, but I didn’t know this classic, nearly ancient book began with the same notion. Neat!

I purchased mine on Kindle, but you can also read it for free at ThreeKingdoms.com. The translation on the Kindle actually has a lot of grammar and formatting mistakes, starting with the first sentence in the book (which I corrected before quoting it here)! It’s as if someone blindly replaced nouns and verbs here and there and then named it their own translation, so that Amazon could sell it for six bucks. Oh well.

Free Will, Part 2: Growth

May 1st, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Anticipation is a requirement for what we humans call free will, and anticipation is a function of a thing’s  limited memory. The other requirement for free will is a thing’s ability to adjust an otherwise set action given new information. Before I get to that, however, I need to talk about growth.

Having been upgraded in my two recent posts about memory, our sphere from my first free will post has a good enough memory to repair damage to its membrane–its short-term memory. Now, imagine it grows and repairs by absorbing (or adsorbing, if you prefer a different visual) carbon molecules. Its memories, being merely smaller spheres within itself, also require them; if there is no carbon to absorb, then it can’t form new memories without damaging itself. Since our sphere is immobile, it must sit and wait for a stray molecule to bump into it, and can only grow and/or update its memory according to the frequency of this random bombardment. (That is unless it sacrifices an existing memory to do so, which it might.)

If it experiences too many events between updates–especially a variety–then the newly formed memory won’t be very accurate. It will be like taking several pictures on the same piece of film and trying to make sense of it as a single picture. Therefore, the higher the frequency of carbon (“food”) absorption, the more accurate its memories will be, which will aid its repair and thus aid its persistence.

So far, everything has happened to this sphere in darkness. Now, a light shines on it, and its membrane just so happens to be photosensitive, deforming along the gradient of light, moving along the surface it rests upon. As it rolls, blob-like, toward (or away from, it really doesn’t matter) the light, it absorbs from carbon that had built up on the ground, and builds a memory of light, movement, and food. The beginnings of perception and mobility.

Fast-forward hundeds, thousands, or millions of iterations according to the demands of your personal incredulity, and this sphere is sophisticated enough to see food several meters away and mobilize to go get it. How? An accident of memory consolidation. As memories within the sphere merge and purge to free up space for more memories, different memories glom into one, forming new associations. Sometimes these associations are detrimental to the sphere’s persistence and are eventually fogotten/purged (needles give us food), but sometimes they are beneficial, a new truth in the sphere’s world (light can show us a needle).

As the sphere grows, it increases how often it can eat and how much it can eat. It can store food so that it can travel further without food to get more food, absorb larger and greater variety of molecules for food, and see food at a distance to determine which direction to move in. More growth means storing an increased quantity and variety of accurate memories, things that form and change according to their own network of significant relationships, ultimately persisting and growing according to their own relationship with the parent sphere.

Does this grown sphere have more freedom than previously? I’d say so. It can respond to and anticipate more stimuli, mobilize to escape threats or find nourishment, and combine/distort memories to create novel behavior.

But even then, that may not be enough to convince anyone of gradations of free will. It is still, after all, just a deterministic system, only with more complexity. And indeed there is still more to this picture, namely the capacity to continuously adjust actions, which is what I believe should be the metric by which a will is determined to be free.

But I’ll complete the picture next time.

Limited Memory

April 26th, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

Some things are complex enough to archive memories that represent changes in the significant relationships that define their thingness. This is not only a useful mechanism for preserving identity after an impermanent change, but also useful for preserving it after a permanent change. But that’s getting into personal identity, which isn’t the topic of this post and thus shouldn’t be in this introduction.

Memory is limited. Imagine the sphere from my first post on free will, and consider its memories are stored inside itself as smaller spheres, compressed projections of its surface. Every day, a new memory sphere is created and added to the bunch. Assuming the parent sphere doesn’t grow, there is a limited amount of space available for storing memories. What are the options for when there’s no more room?

One option is to destroy memories to make room for new ones. Many of them are probably no longer useful, but there will be a point when it is no longer safe to destroy any more. As a thing’s experiences increase in variety, it requires more varieties of memories to aid its persistence. While there is the potentially recursive problem of deciding which memories to destroy, simply decaying at a set rate would suffice for our sphere, and not require any “intelligence”.

Another option is to create smaller memories with smaller spheres. As long as they can still fulfill their purpose, this is an option. There will be a point, however, when they are too small to reproduce the original; if a memory is supposed to be used to repair damage, it can’t leave out any important details. Furthermore, given a variety of experiences will eventually need to be stored, not all memories will be as compressible, and so there is then the problem of using up more memory to help keep that straight. Still, our sphere is simple, so it could probably benefit from compressing its memories.

The option I really wanted to mention was consolidation, because it’s relevant to my next post on free will (which I keep putting off because I keep realizing I have posts’ worth of prerequisite material to cover). Take all the memories that are similar (I know this is a fuzzy word, but I think you can guess how I mean) and combine them into fewer memories to reduce redunancy. Consolidating three memories of the same type into one memory might result in a slightly larger than normal memory of that same type that is harder to dispose of. It’s easy to imagine this happening naturally as space inside the sphere runs out, and the smaller memory spheres press into each other and combine. (Perhaps not so easy, because simple combination would result in redundant or incorrect information in the case of merging spheres, but hey, all metaphors break down somewhere.)

Now I can get back to free will.

Memory

April 21st, 2009 by Ergo Ratio

By definition, everything that happens creates a memory, because “something happening” means that relationships among things are changing. Relationships change at different rates with respect to–well, everything–so the current form of a thing is actually a composite memory of  every other thing with which it has or had (or will have?) a significant relationship. Every thing is therefore a memory of a memory of a memory of a memory of–what, exactly?

Nothing. Everything. Whatever. I’ll explore that thought sometime when I feel like being mythological. In any case, every thing is an imperfect memory of whatever it’s a memory of, almost by definition; it only references the significant relationships it has with other things, not all the relationships that define those other things.

I’d like to quickly stress that memory is not a time-dependent concept; things can change with respect to anything. It is easiest, however, to think of memory with respect to time, so I will continue with that in mind.

A change in a thing–that is, a memory, itself a thing–lies somewhere on spectrum between impermanence and permanence. (I avoid “temporality” because it does imply time.) Processes regulate their identities insofar as they are capable, so that their memories are erased or made uninfluential to their thing-ness as quickly as possible. This is just another way of saying they try to prevent unwelcome changes in their relationships. Not all memory can be erased, however, just as not all unwelcome relationships can be avoided or undone. A rock has no means to regulate the memory of it being broken; that memory is permanent, notwithstanding fantastical intervention.

On the one hand, memories are changes in a thing, and changes threaten persistence. On the other, those changes might strengthen its ability to persist at the cost of no longer being the same thing. It’s a common conundrum, and the strategy for its reconciliation is always the same: create an imperfect memory of the memory, then erase the original. In other words, archive.

The method of archiving is to create an insignificant (to both the thing’s identity and every other thing’s identity–thus “internal”) new relationship that defines the original memory, then undo the original memory by repairing, as much as possible, the significant relationships that were originally changed (by referencing yet another internal memory of what those should look like). The new memory, being both insignificant and wholly–well, mostly, depending on the thing’s complexity*–internal to that thing, is less likely to be influenced by another thing. The practical upshot of which is that the damage of the original memory is repaired while useful properties of that memory are preserved to strengthen that thing’s ability to persist to find an answer to the ultimate question of what to do next. (I swear I get out of breath just eyeballing my own sentences.)

I say the word, “damage”, because I’m talking about changes in significant relationships, which identify a given thing. Breaking your leg significantly changes your relationship with the world. The damage is eventually repaired, but you learn not to jump off the swing set, because you have archived the memory of a particular significant relationship your leg had with the ground.

Not all memory is damage, of course. Changes in insignificant relationships happen all the time, such as in perception; they come and go so fast that we don’t think of them as damage. Nonetheless, there is a process that must change (receive damage) to detect a difference in the environment, optionally create a new internal memory outside the detection mechanism, and then change back so that it can detect difference again.

Every thing is a memory, and every memory is a thing. Every thing is a process. Every process changes so that it can persist, and every change is a change in memory. Nothing can happen without a risk to the fidelity of memory, as the process of repairing a memory–itself a memory–can also change. The only perfect memory is a memory that can never be accessed. The only such memory would be a memory of a thing without relationships to anything else, and the only such thing is Nothing. Or Everything. Maybe that’s all we are–memories of perfection.

I started feeling a bit mythological after all.

* A complex a process can create more and better-sequestered archives than a simple one. I hope this will become apparent in my next post about free will, however, so I won’t linger here.